Attack-Defense Game Model with Multi-Type Attackers Considering Information Dilemma.

ABSTRACT: Today, people rely heavily on infrastructure networks. Attacks on infrastructure networks can lead to significant property damage and production stagnation. The game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for solving the problem of infrastructure protection. Existing models consider only the beneficial effects that the defender obtains from information gaps. If the attacker's countermeasures are ignored, the defender will become passive. Herein, we consider that a proficient attacker with a probability in the game can fill information gaps in the network. First, we introduce the link-hiding rule and the information dilemma. Second, based on the Bayesian static game model, we establish an attack-defense game model with multiple types of attackers. In the game model, we consider re

SUBMITTER: Qi G 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC9858562 | biostudies-literature | 2022 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature