Improving timely childhood immunizations through pay for performance in Medicaid-managed care.
ABSTRACT: To evaluate the impact of a "piece-rate" pay-for-performance (P4P) program aimed at rewarding up-to-date immunization delivery to 2-year-olds according to the recommended series.Plan-level data from New York State's Quality Assurance Reporting Requirement and claims data from Hudson Health Plan for 2003-2007. In 2003 Hudson Health Plan, a not-for-profit Medicaid-focused managed care plan, introduced a U.S.$200 bonus payment for each fully immunized 2-year-old and provided administrative supports for identifying children who may need immunization. This represented a potential bonus of 15-25 percent above base reimbursement for eligible 2-year-olds.Case-comparison and interrupted times series.Immunization rates within Hudson Health Plan rose at a significantly, albeit modestly, higher rate than the robust secular trend noted among comparison health plans. Supplementary analyses suggest that there was no significant change in preexisting disparities during the study period, and that children with chronic conditions have significantly greater odds of being fully immunized during the entire study period.This study suggests that a piece-rate P4P program with appropriate administrative supports can be effective at improving childhood immunization rates.
Project description:To examine the effects of incentive payment frequency on quality measures in a physician-specific pay-for-performance (P4P) experiment.A multispecialty physician group practice.In 2007, all primary care physicians (n=179) were randomized into two study arms differing by the frequency of incentive payment, either four quarterly bonus checks or a single year-end bonus (maximum of U.S.$5,000/year for both arms).Data were extracted from electronic health records. Quality measure scores between the two arms over four quarters were compared.There was no difference between the two arms in average quality measure score or in total bonus amount earned.Physicians' responses to a P4P program with a small maximum bonus do not differ by frequency of bonus payment.
Project description:Research on the effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) in health care indicates largely disappointing results. This central finding, however, may mask important heterogeneity in the effects of P4P. We conducted a literature review to assess whether hospital and physician performance in P4P vary by patient and catchment area factors, organizational and structural capabilities, and P4P program characteristics. Several findings emerged: organizational size, practice type, teaching status, and physician age and gender modify performance in P4P. For physician practices and hospitals, a higher proportion of poor and minority patients is consistently associated with worse performance. Other theoretically influential characteristics-including information technology and staffing levels-yield mixed results. Inconsistent and contradictory effects of bonus likelihood, bonus size, and marginal costs on performance in P4P suggest organizations have not responded strategically to financial incentives. We conclude that extant heterogeneity in the effects of P4P does not fundamentally alter current assessments about its effectiveness.
Project description:To determine whether hospitals increase efforts on easy tasks relative to difficult tasks to improve scores under pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives.The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Compare data from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005 and 2003 American Hospital Association Annual Survey data.We classified measures of process compliance targeted by the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration as easy or difficult to improve based on whether they introduce additional per-patient costs. We compared process compliance on easy and difficult tasks at hospitals eligible for P4P bonus payments relative to hospitals engaged in public reporting using random effects regression models.P4P hospitals did not preferentially increase efforts for easy tasks in patients with heart failure or pneumonia, but they did exhibit modestly greater effort on easy tasks for heart attack admissions. There is no systematic evidence that effort was allocated toward easier processes of care and away from more difficult tasks.Despite perverse P4P incentives to change allocation of efforts across tasks to maximize performance scores at lowest cost, we find little evidence that hospitals respond to P4P incentives as hypothesized. Alternative incentive structures may motivate greater response by targeted hospitals.
Project description:System dynamics methods were used to explore effective implementation pathways for improving health systems performance through pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes. A causal loop diagram was developed to delineate primary causal relationships for service delivery within primary health facilities. A quantitative stock-and-flow model was developed next. The stock-and-flow model was then used to simulate the impact of various P4P implementation scenarios on quality and volume of services. Data from the Afghanistan national facility survey in 2012 was used to calibrate the model. The models show that P4P bonuses could increase health workers' motivation leading to higher levels of quality and volume of services. Gaming could reduce or even reverse this desired effect, leading to levels of quality and volume of services that are below baseline levels. Implementation issues, such as delays in the disbursement of P4P bonuses and low levels of P4P bonuses, also reduce the desired effect of P4P on quality and volume, but they do not cause the outputs to fall below baseline levels. Optimal effect of P4P on quality and volume of services is obtained when P4P bonuses are distributed per the health workers' contributions to the services that triggered the payments. Other distribution algorithms such as equal allocation or allocations proportionate to salaries resulted in quality and volume levels that were substantially lower, sometimes below baseline. The system dynamics models served to inform, with quantitative results, the theory of change underlying P4P intervention. Specific implementation strategies, such as prompt disbursement of adequate levels of performance bonus distributed per health workers' contribution to service, increase the likelihood of P4P success. Poorly designed P4P schemes, such as those without an optimal algorithm for distributing performance bonuses and adequate safeguards for gaming, can have a negative overall impact on health service delivery systems.
Project description:<h4>Background</h4>International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users were involved in decisions about the P4P methods.<h4>Methods</h4>For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands.<h4>Results</h4>Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains (clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance. The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line with target users' views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program.
Project description:Should health systems invest more in access to care by expanding insurance coverage or in health care services including improving the quality of care? Comparing these options experimentally would shed light on the impact and cost-effectiveness of these strategies.The Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS) was a randomized policy experiment conducted across 30 districts in the Philippines. The study had a control group and two policy intervention groups intended to improve the health of young children. The demand-side intervention in QIDS was universal health insurance coverage (UHC) for children aged 5 years or younger, and a supply-side intervention, a pay-for-performance (P4P) bonus for all providers who met pre-determined quality levels. In this paper, we compare the impacts of these policies from the QIDS experiment on childhood wasting by calculating DALYs averted per US$spent.The direct per capita costs to implement UHC and P4P are US$4.08 and US$1.98 higher, respectively, compared to control. DALYs due to wasting were reduced by 334,862 in UHC and 1,073,185 in P4P. When adjustments are made for the efficiency of higher quality, the DALYS averted per US$ spent is similar in the two arms, 1.56 and 1.58 for UHC and P4P, respectively. Since the P4P quality improvements touches all patients seen by qualifying providers (32% in UHC versus 100% in P4P), there is a larger reduction in DALYs. With similar programmatic costs for either intervention, in this study, each US$spent under P4P yielded 1.52 DALYs averted compared to the standard program, while UHC yielded only a 0.50 DALY reduction.P4P had a greater impact and was more cost-effective compared to UHC as measured by DALYs averted. While expanded insurance benefit ceilings affected only those who are covered, P4P incentivizes practice quality improvement regardless of whether children are insured or uninsured.
Project description:OBJECTIVE: To assess the extent to which the racial/ethnic composition of Medicare Advantage (MA) plans reflects the composition of their areas of operation, given the potential incentives created by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' Quality Bonus Payments for such plans to avoid enrolling racial/ethnic minority beneficiaries. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: 2009 Medicare Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (MCAHPS) survey and administrative data from the Medicare Enrollment Database. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: We defined each plan's area of operation as all counties in which it had MA enrollees, and we created a matrix of race/ethnicity by plan by county of residence to assess the racial/ethnic distribution of each plan's enrollees in comparison with the racial/ethnic composition of MA beneficiaries in its operational area. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: There is little evidence that health plans are selectively underenrolling blacks, Latinos, or Asians to a substantial degree. A small but potentially important subset of plans disproportionately serves minority beneficiaries. CONCLUSIONS: These findings provide a baseline profile that will enable crucial ongoing monitoring to assess how the implementation of Quality Bonus Payments may affect MA plan coverage of minority populations.
Project description:Importance:Despite limited effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P), payers continue to expand P4P nationally. Objective:To test whether increasing bonus size or adding the behavioral economic principles of increased social pressure (ISP) or loss aversion (LA) improves the effectiveness of P4P. Design, Setting, and Participants:Parallel studies conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2016, consisted of a randomized clinical trial with patients cluster-randomized by practice site to an active control group (larger bonus size [LBS] only) or to groups with 1 of 2 behavioral economic interventions added and a cohort study comparing changes in outcomes among patients of physicians receiving an LBS with outcomes in propensity-matched physicians not receiving an LBS. A total of 8118 patients attributed to 66 physicians with 1 of 5 chronic conditions were treated at Advocate HealthCare, an integrated health system in Illinois. Data were analyzed using intention to treat and multiple imputation from February 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. Interventions:Physician participants received an LBS increased by a mean of $3355 per physician (LBS-only group); prefunded incentives to elicit LA and an LBS; or increasing proportion of a P4P bonus determined by group performance from 30% to 50% (ISP) and an LBS. Main Outcomes and Measures:The proportion of 20 evidence-based quality measures achieved at the patient level. Results:A total of 86 physicians were eligible for the randomized trial. Of these, 32 were excluded because they did not have unique attributed patients. Fifty-four physicians were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups, and 33 physicians (54.5% male; mean [SD] age, 57  years) and 3747 patients (63.6% female; mean [SD] age, 64  years) were included in the final analysis. Nine physicians and 864 patients were randomized to the LBS-only group, 13 physicians and 1496 patients to the LBS plus ISP group, and 11 physicians and 1387 patients to the LBS plus LA group. Physician characteristics did not differ significantly by arm, such as mean (SD) physician age ranging from 56 (9) to 59 (9) years, and sex (6 [46.2%] to 6 [66.7%] male). No differences were found between the LBS-only and the intervention groups (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] for LBS plus LA vs LBS-only, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.65-1.15; P?=?.31]; aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS-only, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.64-1.42; P?=?.81]; and aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS plus LA, 1.10 [95% CI, 0.75-1.61; P?=?.62]). Increased bonus size was associated with a greater increase in evidence-based care relative to the comparison group (risk-standardized absolute difference-in-differences, 3.2 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.9-4.5 percentage points; P?<?.001). Conclusions and Relevance:Increased bonus size was associated with significantly improved quality of care relative to a comparison group. Adding ISP and opportunities for LA did not improve quality. Trial Registration:ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02634879.
Project description:The recent regulatory changes enacted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have identified hospital readmission rates as a critical healthcare quality metric. This research focuses on the utilization of pay-for-performance (P4P) mechanisms to cost effectively reduce hospital readmission rates and meet the regulatory standards set by CMS. Using the experimental economics laboratory we find that both of the P4P mechanisms researched, bonus and bundled payments, cost-effectively meet the performance criteria set forth by CMS. The bundled payment mechanism generates the largest reduction in patient length of stay (LOS) without altering the probability of readmission. Combined these results indicate that utilizing P4P mechanisms incentivizes cost effective reductions in hospital readmission rates.
Project description:Taiwan's National Health Insurance (NHI) Program implemented a Diabetes Pay-for-Performance Program (P4P) based on process-of-care measures in 2001. In late 2006, that P4P program was reformed to also include achievement of intermediate health outcomes. This study examined how the change in design affected patient risk selection.Study populations were identified from a 2002 to 2003 period (Phase 1) and a 2007 to 2008 period (Phase 2), spanning pre- and postimplementation of reforms in the P4P incentive design. Phase 1 had 74,529 newly enrolled P4P patients and 215,572 non-P4P patients, and Phase 2 had 76,901 newly enrolled P4P patients and 299,573 non-P4P patients. Logistic regression models were used to estimate the effect of changes in design on P4P patient selection.Patients with greater disease severity and comorbidity were more likely to be excluded from the P4P program in both phases. Furthermore, the additional financial incentive for patients' intermediate outcomes moderately worsened patient risk selection.Policy makers need to carefully monitor the care of the diabetes patients with more severe and complex disease statuses after the changes of P4P financial incentive design.