Research on green decision making of pharmaceutical logistics considering government subsidy strategy.
ABSTRACT: In view of the difficulty, high cost and complex technology of pharmaceutical logistics green transformation, based on the idea of green supply chain, three different government subsidy strategies for green logistics were proposed. Firstly, by constructing a Stackelberg game model with pharmaceutical logistics provider as the leader and manufacturer as the followers, the behavior selection and optimal decisions of the participants under the anarchic subsidy strategy, the single subsidy strategy of the pharmaceutical logistics provider, the single subsidy strategy of the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the coordinated subsidy strategy are analyzed respectively. Furthermore, the effects of different subsidy strategies on the green investment and strategy selection of logistics provider and manufacturer are compared. Finally, according to the research results, the paper provides reference and suggestions for the formulation of government subsidy strategy. The results show that the three subsidy strategies have different degrees of incentive effect on the green transformation of pharmaceutical logistics, and the single logistics provider subsidy strategy is the best.
Project description:This paper studies the Retailer Stackelberg game in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer where they compete simultaneously under three factors including price, service and simple price discount contract. It is assumed that the second manufacturer provides service directly to his customers, and the retailer provides service for the first product's customers, while the retailer buys the first product under price discount from the first manufacturer. The analysis of the optimal equilibrium solutions and the results of the numerical examples show that if a manufacturer chooses the appropriate range of discount rate, he will gain more profit than when there is no discount given to the retailer. This situation can be considered as an effective tool for the coordination of the first manufacturer and the retailer to offer discount by manufacturer and to provide the service by the retailer. We obtain equilibrium solution of Retailer Stackelberg game and analyze the numerical examples under two cases: a) the manufacturers sell their products to the retailer without price discount contract. b) The first manufacturer sells his products to the retailer with the simple price discount contract. The preliminary results show that the service and the price discount contract can improve the performance of supply chain.
Project description:We consider an integrated production and distribution scheduling problem faced by a typical make-to-order manufacturer which relies on a third-party logistics (3PL) provider for finished product delivery to customers. In the beginning of a planning horizon, the manufacturer has received a set of orders to be processed on a single production line. Completed orders are delivered to customers by a finite number of vehicles provided by the 3PL company which follows a fixed daily or weekly shipping schedule such that the vehicles have fixed departure dates which are not part of the decisions. The problem is to find a feasible schedule that minimizes one of the following objective functions when processing times and weights are oppositely ordered: (1) the total weight of late orders and (2) the number of vehicles used subject to the condition that the total weight of late orders is minimum. We show that both problems are solvable in polynomial time.
Project description:Based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game analysis, this paper constructs a product quality control strategy model for three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel) in a three-echelon supply chain, which is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer. This paper studies how to design a distribution channel strategy and provides a product quality control strategy. Furthermore, this paper analyzes three types of distribution channels strategy in the context of how they influence a manufacturer's product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, a retailer's product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer's product demand decision. We compare the manufacturer's product quality level, quality prevention effort level, wholesale price, direct sale price and the retailer's quality inspection effort level, retail price in three types of distribution channels and determine the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits function and the final customer's consumer surplus. In addition, we introduce the distribution channels demand elasticity ratio to analyze the influence of determining the product quality control strategy. Most importantly, we conduct a numerical sample analysis that will prove the model's effectiveness and indicate a specific application in practice.
Project description:With the rising environmental concerns among consumers all over the world, sustainability has received considerable attention, and numerous enterprises are adopting various practices such as investing in energy-saving to improve sustainability in supply chains. However, many previous researches always assume that decision makers are perfectly rational and neglect the behavioral concerns of decision makers. This paper considers a two-stage sustainable supply chain with behavioral concerns in order to develop more realistic models, and mainly focuses on the energy-saving and pricing decisions in the decentralized system, as well as how to improve energy-saving level and profits. We develop decentralized decision-making models under two types of behavioral concerns: fairness concern and risk aversion, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader. The effect of the behavioral concerns on the optimal decisions and corresponding profits is discussed in detail. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the fairness behavior always causes a negative effect on the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, while it could benefit the retailer in profits. The risk aversion behavior always benefits the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, whereas it could make the retailer suffer. Note that both the optimal energy-saving level and corresponding profit of the total supply chain under two types of behavioral concerns are lower than that in the centralized system, thereby we propose a revenue-cost-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win outcome and the energy-saving level can be improved. In addition, some managerial implications through our analytical and numerical results are summarized in this paper.
Project description:In a two-echelon new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, the coordination and sustainability problem is investigated. The risk-averse retailer, who makes sales effort and undertakes the incurred effort cost, decides the order quantity and sales effort level under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion. We derive the optimal centralized decisions of a vertically integrated supply chain where the retailer is owned by the manufacturer. Taking such a centralized case as the benchmark, we prove that the subsidy-sharing-based wholesale price (SS-WP) contract fails to coordinate the NEV supply chain under the decentralized case where the retailer makes decisions independently. Then we design a subsidy-sharing-based sales rebate/penalty (SS-SRP) contract and derive the contract parameters to achieve coordination. We evaluate the coordination efficiency of this contract and find that a well-designed SS-SRP contract can promote the NEV sales and lead to a Pareto-improving win-win situation for both the NEV manufacturer and retailer compared to the non-coordination case. A series of numerical experiments are carried out to compare the effects of significant parameters under the SS-WP and SS-SRP contract and provide additional observations and implications, including an indication of the necessary conditions to sustainably maintain the NEV supply chain.
Project description:<h4>Introduction</h4>Many low- and middle-income countries are implementing strategies to increase dialysis availability as growing numbers of people reach end-stage renal disease. Despite efforts to subsidize care, the economic sustainability of chronic dialysis in these settings remains uncertain. We evaluated the association of medical subsidy with household financial hardship related to hemodialysis in Kerala, India, a state with high penetrance of procedure-based subsidies for patients on dialysis.<h4>Methods</h4>Patients on maintenance hemodialysis at 15 facilities in Kerala were administered a questionnaire that ascertained demographics, dialysis details, and household finances. We estimated direct and indirect costs of hemodialysis, and described the use of medical subsidy. We evaluated whether presence of subsidy (private, charity, or government-sponsored) was associated with lower catastrophic health expenditure (defined as ?40% of nonsubsistence expenditure spent on dialysis) or distress financing.<h4>Results</h4>Of the 835 patients surveyed, 759 (91%) reported their households experienced catastrophic health expenditure, and 644 (77%) engaged in distress financing. Median dialysis-related expenditure was 80% (25th-75th percentile: 60%-90%) of household nonsubsistence expenditure. Government subsidies were used by 238 (29%) of households, 139 (58%) of which were in the lowest income category. Catastrophic health expenditure was present in 215 (90%) of households receiving government subsidy and 332 (93%) without subsidy.<h4>Conclusions</h4>Provision of medical subsidy in Kerala, India was not associated with lower rates of household financial hardship related to long-term hemodialysis therapy. Transparent counseling on impending costs and innovative strategies to mitigate household financial distress are necessary for persons with end-stage renal disease in resource-limited settings.
Project description:BACKGROUND: The Affordable Medicines Facility - malaria (AMFm), implemented at national scale in eight African countries or territories, subsidized quality-assured artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) and included communication campaigns to support implementation and promote appropriate anti-malarial use. This paper reports private for-profit provider awareness of key features of the AMFm programme, and changes in provider knowledge of appropriate malaria treatment. METHODS: This study had a non-experimental design based on nationally representative surveys of outlets stocking anti-malarials before (2009/10) and after (2011) the AMFm roll-out. RESULTS: Based on data from over 19,500 outlets, results show that in four of eight settings, where communication campaigns were implemented for 5-9 months, 76%-94% awareness of the AMFm 'green leaf' logo, 57%-74% awareness of the ACT subsidy programme, and 52%-80% awareness of the correct recommended retail price (RRP) of subsidized ACT were recorded. However, in the remaining four settings where communication campaigns were implemented for three months or less, levels were substantially lower. In six of eight settings, increases of at least 10 percentage points in private for-profit providers' knowledge of the correct first-line treatment for uncomplicated malaria were seen; and in three of these the levels of knowledge achieved at endline were over 80%. CONCLUSIONS: The results support the interpretation that, in addition to the availability of subsidized ACT, the intensity of communication campaigns may have contributed to the reported levels of AMFm-related awareness and knowledge among private for-profit providers. Future subsidy programmes for anti-malarials or other treatments should similarly include communication activities.
Project description:In common interest games in which players are motivated to coordinate their strategies to achieve a jointly optimal outcome, orthodox game theory provides no general reason or justification for choosing the required strategies. In the simplest cases, where the optimal strategies are intuitively obvious, human decision makers generally coordinate without difficulty, but how they achieve this is poorly understood. Most theories seeking to explain strategic coordination have limited applicability, or require changes to the game specification, or introduce implausible assumptions or radical departures from fundamental game-theoretic assumptions. The theory of strong Stackelberg reasoning, according to which players choose strategies that would maximize their own payoffs if their co-players could invariably anticipate any strategy and respond with a best reply to it, avoids these problems and explains strategic coordination in all dyadic common interest games. Previous experimental evidence has provided evidence for strong Stackelberg reasoning in asymmetric games. Here we report evidence from two experiments consistent with players being influenced by strong Stackelberg reasoning in a wide variety of symmetric 3 × 3 games but tending to revert to other choice criteria when strong Stackelberg reasoning generates small payoffs.
Project description:The Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria (AMFm) was conceived as a global market-based mechanism to increase access to effective malaria treatment and prolong effectiveness of artemisinin. Although results from a pilot implementation suggested that the subsidy was effective in increasing access to high-quality artemisinin combination therapies (ACTs), the Global Fund has converted AMFm into a country-driven mechanism whereby individual countries could choose to fund the subsidy from within their country envelopes. Because the initial costs of the subsidy in the pilot countries was higher than expected, countries are also exploring alternatives to a universal subsidy, such as subsidizing only child doses. We examined the incremental cost-effectiveness of a child-targeted policy using an age-structured bioeconomic model of malaria from the provider perspective. Because the vast majority of malaria deaths occur in children, targeting children could potentially improve the cost-effectiveness of the subsidy, though it would avert significantly fewer deaths. However, the benefits of a child-targeted subsidy (i.e. deaths averted) are eroded as leakage (i.e. older individuals taking young child-targeted doses) increases, with few of the benefits of a universal subsidy gained (i.e. reductions in overall prevalence). Although potentially more cost-effective, a child-targeted subsidy must contain measures to reduce the possibility of leakage.
Project description:The dataset explicates farmer?s perceptions about fertilizer subsidy policy in Bangladesh and the factors that affect farm level fertilizer usage. Primary data were collected from 300 farm households from three regions of the country belonging to four farm size groups i.e., marginal, small, medium and large. Dataset reveals that a major part of sampled marginal farmers was unaware that government is providing huge subsidy on the fertilizer market. Most of the marginal farmers were dissatisfied claiming the uneven distribution of subsidy benefit whereas majority of large farmers were satisfied with current policy and market prices. At the same time, output prices relative to fertilizer price received by the farmers, off-farm income and extension services were significantly affecting fertilizer use intensity of different farm size groups while subsidy policy impact was not significant.