Evolutionary game and simulation analysis of construction waste recycling from the perspective of stakeholders
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Wang Y
PROVIDER: S-EPMC11349105 | biostudies-literature | 2024 Jan
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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