A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of sports data rights protection from the perspective of stakeholder
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Li X
PROVIDER: S-EPMC10653474 | biostudies-literature | 2023 Jan
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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