Evolution of conditional cooperation under multilevel selection.

ABSTRACT: We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-group selection. Individuals play public goods games within their groups using conditional strategies, which are represented as piecewise linear response functions. Accordingly, groups engage in conflicts with a certain probability. In contrast to previous studies, we consider continuous contribution levels and a rich set of conditional strategies, allowing for a wide range of possible interactions between strategies. We find that the existence of conditional strategies enables the stabilization of cooperation even under strong intra-group selection. The strategy that eventually dominates in the population has two key properties: (i) It is unexploitable with strong intra-group selection; (ii) It

SUBMITTER: Zhang H 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4786827 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Mar

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature