How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Belot M
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5326809 | biostudies-literature | 2017
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game.
Belot Michèle M van de Ven Jeroen J
Experimental economics 20160222 1
We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option t ...[more]
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