Timing Uncertainty in Collective Risk Dilemmas Encourages Group Reciprocation and Polarization.

ABSTRACT: Social dilemmas are often shaped by actions involving uncertain returns only achievable in the future, such as climate action or voluntary vaccination. In this context, uncertainty may produce non-trivial effects. Here, we assess experimentally - through a collective risk dilemma - the effect of timing uncertainty, i.e. how uncertainty about when a target needs to be reached affects the participants' behaviors. We show that timing uncertainty prompts not only early generosity but also polarized outcomes, where participants' total contributions are distributed unevenly. Furthermore, analyzing participants' behavior under timing uncertainty reveals an increase in reciprocal strategies. A data-driven game-theoretical model captures the self-organizing dynamics underpinning these behavioral pa

SUBMITTER: Domingos EF 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7701182 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature