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Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints.

ABSTRACT: In repeated social interactions, individuals often employ reciprocal strategies to maintain cooperation. To explore the emergence of reciprocity, many theoretical models assume synchronized decision making. In each round, individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Yet many manifestations of reciprocity in nature are asynchronous. Individuals provide help at one time and receive help at another. Here, we explore such alternating games in which players take turns. We mathematically characterize all Nash equilibria among memory-one strategies. Moreover, we use evolutionary simulations to explore various model extensions, exploring the effect of discounted games, irregular alternation patterns, and higher memory. In all cases, we observe that mutual cooperation still evolves for a wide range of parameter values. However, compared to simultaneous games, alternating games require different strategies to maintain cooperation in noisy environments. Moreover, none of the respective strategies are evolutionarily stable.

SUBMITTER: Park PS

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8825791 | biostudies-literature | 2022 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints.

Park Peter S PS Nowak Martin A MA Hilbe Christian C

Nature communications 20220208 1

In repeated social interactions, individuals often employ reciprocal strategies to maintain cooperation. To explore the emergence of reciprocity, many theoretical models assume synchronized decision making. In each round, individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Yet many manifestations of reciprocity in nature are asynchronous. Individuals provide help at one time and receive help at another. Here, we explore such alternating games in which players take turns. We mathematic ...[more]

PMID: 35136025

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