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Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions.

ABSTRACT: Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.

Supplementary information

The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x.

SUBMITTER: Buckenmaier J

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8298200 | biostudies-literature | 2021

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions.

Buckenmaier Johannes J Dimant Eugen E Posten Ann-Christin AC Schmidt Ulrich U

Journal of risk and uncertainty 20210723 2

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combi ...[more]

PMID: 34316094

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Project description:The threat posed to protected areas by the illegal killing of wildlife is countered principally by ranger patrols that aim to detect and deter potential offenders. Deterring poaching is a fundamental conservation objective, but its achievement is difficult to identify, especially when the prime source of information comes in the form of the patrols' own records, which inevitably contain biases. The most common metric of deterrence is a plot of illegal activities detected per unit of patrol effort (CPUE) against patrol effort (CPUE-E). We devised a simple, mechanistic model of law breaking and law enforcement in which we simulated deterrence alongside exogenous changes in the frequency of offences under different temporal patterns of enforcement effort. The CPUE-E plots were not reliable indicators of deterrence. However, plots of change in CPUE over change in effort (ΔCPUE-ΔE) reliably identified deterrence, regardless of the temporal distribution of effort or any exogenous change in illegal activity levels as long as the time lag between patrol effort and subsequent behavioral change among offenders was approximately known. The ΔCPUE-ΔE plots offered a robust, simple metric for monitoring patrol effectiveness; were no more conceptually complicated than the basic CPUE-E plots; and required no specialist knowledge or software to produce. Our findings demonstrate the need to account for temporal autocorrelation in patrol data and to consider appropriate (and poaching-activity-specific) intervals for aggregation. They also reveal important gaps in understanding of deterrence in this context, especially the mechanisms by which it occurs. In practical applications, we recommend the use of ΔCPUE-ΔE plots in preference to other basic metrics and advise that deterrence should be suspected only if there is a clear negative slope. Distinct types of illegal activity should not be grouped together for analysis, especially if the signs of their occurrence have different persistence times in the environment.

Dataset Information

Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions.

Supplementary information

Publications

Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions.

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