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Is depression associated with reduced optimistic belief updating?

ABSTRACT: When asked to evaluate their probability of experiencing a negative life event, healthy individuals update their beliefs more following good news than bad. This is referred to as optimistic belief updating. By contrast, individuals with depression update their beliefs by a similar amount, showing reduced optimism. We conducted the first independent replication of this effect and extended this work to examine whether reduced optimistic belief updating in depression also occurs for positive life events. Replicating previous research, healthy and depression groups differed in belief updating for negative events (β = 0.71, 95% CI: 0.24, 1.18). Whereas healthy participants updated their beliefs more following good news than bad, individuals experiencing depression lacked this bias. However, our findings for positive events were inconclusive. While we did not find statistical evidence that patterns of belief updating between groups varied by valence (β = -0.51, 95% CI: -1.16, 0.15), mean update scores suggested that both groups showed largely similar updating for positive life events. Our results add confidence to previous findings that depression is characterized by negative future expectations maintained by reduced updating in response to good news. However, further research is required to understand the specificity of this to negative events, and into refining methods for quantifying belief updating in clinical and non-clinical research.

SUBMITTER: Hobbs C

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8808098 | biostudies-literature | 2022 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Is depression associated with reduced optimistic belief updating?

Hobbs Catherine C Vozarova Petra P Sabharwal Aarushi A Shah Punit P Button Katherine K

Royal Society open science 20220202 2

When asked to evaluate their probability of experiencing a negative life event, healthy individuals update their beliefs more following good news than bad. This is referred to as optimistic belief updating. By contrast, individuals with depression update their beliefs by a similar amount, showing reduced optimism. We conducted the first independent replication of this effect and extended this work to examine whether reduced optimistic belief updating in depression also occurs for positive life e ...[more]

PMID: 35127107

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Project description:Individuals prone to anxiety and depression often report beliefs and make judgements about themselves that are more negative than those reported by others. We use computational modeling of a richly naturalistic task to disentangle the role of negative priors versus negatively biased belief updating and to investigate their association with different dimensions of Internalizing psychopathology. Undergraduate participants first provided profiles for a hypothetical tech internship. They then viewed pairs of other profiles and selected the individual they would prefer to work alongside out of each pair. In a subsequent phase of the experiment, participants made judgments about their relative popularity as hypothetical internship partners both before any feedback and after each of 20 items of feedback revealing whether or not they had been selected as the preferred teammate from a given pairing. Scores on latent factors of general negative affect, anxiety-specific affect and depression-specific affect were estimated using participants' self-report scores on standardized measures of anxiety and depression together with factor loadings from a bifactor analysis conducted previously. Higher scores on the depression-specific factor were linked to more negative prior beliefs but were not associated with differences in belief updating. In contrast, higher scores on the anxiety-specific factor were associated with a negative bias in belief updating but no difference in prior beliefs. These findings indicate that, to at least some extent, distinct processes may impact the formation of belief priors and in-the-moment belief updating and that these processes may be differentially disrupted in depression and anxiety. Future directions for enquiry include examination of the possibility that prior beliefs biases in depression might reflect generalization from prior experiences or global schema whereas belief updating biases in anxiety might be more situationally specific.

Project description:People tend to update beliefs about their future outcomes in a valence-dependent way: they are likely to incorporate good news and to neglect bad news. However, belief formation is a complex process which depends not only on motivational factors such as the desire for favorable conclusions, but also on multiple cognitive variables such as prior beliefs, knowledge about personal vulnerabilities and resources, and the size of the probabilities and estimation errors. Thus, we applied computational modeling in order to test for valence-induced biases in updating while formally controlling for relevant cognitive factors. We compared biased and unbiased Bayesian models of belief updating, and specified alternative models based on reinforcement learning. The experiment consisted of 80 trials with 80 different adverse future life events. In each trial, participants estimated the base rate of one of these events and estimated their own risk of experiencing the event before and after being confronted with the actual base rate. Belief updates corresponded to the difference between the two self-risk estimates. Valence-dependent updating was assessed by comparing trials with good news (better-than-expected base rates) with trials with bad news (worse-than-expected base rates). After receiving bad relative to good news, participants' updates were smaller and deviated more strongly from rational Bayesian predictions, indicating a valence-induced bias. Model comparison revealed that the biased (i.e., optimistic) Bayesian model of belief updating better accounted for data than the unbiased (i.e., rational) Bayesian model, confirming that the valence of the new information influenced the amount of updating. Moreover, alternative computational modeling based on reinforcement learning demonstrated higher learning rates for good than for bad news, as well as a moderating role of personal knowledge. Finally, in this specific experimental context, the approach based on reinforcement learning was superior to the Bayesian approach. The computational validation of valence-dependent belief updating represents a novel support for a genuine optimism bias in human belief formation. Moreover, the precise control of relevant cognitive variables justifies the conclusion that the motivation to adopt the most favorable self-referential conclusions biases human judgments.

Project description:ImportanceClinical research has shown that persistent negative beliefs maintain depression and that subanesthetic ketamine infusions induce rapid antidepressant responses.ObjectiveTo evaluate whether ketamine alters belief updating and how such cognitive effects are associated with the clinical effects of ketamine.Design, setting, and participantsThis study used an observational case-control protocol with a mixed-effects design that nested 2 groups by 2 testing time points. Observers were not blinded. Patients with treatment-resistant depression (TRD) and healthy volunteer participants aged 34 to 68 years were included. Patients with TRD were diagnosed with major depressive disorder or bipolar depression, had a Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale score greater than 20, a Maudsley Staging Method score greater than 7, and failed to respond to at least 2 prior antidepressant trials. Exclusion criteria were any other psychiatric, neurological, or neurosurgical comorbidities, substance use or addictive disorders, and recreational ketamine consumption. Data were collected from January to February 2019 and from May to December 2019, and data were analyzed from January 2020 to July 2021.ExposuresPatients with TRD were observed 24 hours before single ketamine infusion, 4 hours after the infusion, and 4 hours after the third infusion, which was 1 week after the first infusion. Healthy control participants were observed twice 1 week apart without ketamine exposure.Main outcomes and measuresMontgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale score and belief updating after belief updating when patients received good news and bad news measured by a cognitive belief-updating task and mathematically formalized by a computational reinforcement learning model.ResultsOf 56 included participants, 29 (52%) were male, and the mean (SEM) age was 52.3 (1.2) years. A total of 26 patients with TRD and 30 control participants were included. A significant group × testing time point × news valence interaction showed that patients with TRD updated their beliefs more after good than bad news following a single ketamine infusion (controlled for age and education: β = -0.91; 95% CI, -1.58 to -0.24; t216 = -2.67; P = .008) than controls. Computational modeling showed that this effect was associated with asymmetrical learning rates (LRs) after ketamine treatment (good news LRs after ketamine, 0.51 [SEM, 0.04]; bad news LRs after ketamine 0.36 [SEM, 0.03], t25 = 3.8; P < .001) and partially mediated early antidepressant responses (path a*b: β = -1.00 [SEM, 0.66]; t26 = -1.53; z = -1.98; P = .04).Conclusions and relevanceThese findings provide novel insights into the cognitive mechanisms of the action of ketamine in patients with TRD, with promising perspectives for augmented psychotherapy for individuals with mood disorders.

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Is depression associated with reduced optimistic belief updating?

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Is depression associated with reduced optimistic belief updating?

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