Social Prevalence Is Rationally Integrated in Belief Updating.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Orticio E
PROVIDER: S-EPMC9692052 | biostudies-literature | 2022
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Social Prevalence Is Rationally Integrated in Belief Updating.
Orticio Evan E Martí Louis L Kidd Celeste C
Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science 20220701
People rely on social information to inform their beliefs. We ask whether and to what degree the perceived prevalence of a belief influences belief adoption. We present the results of two experiments that show how increases in a person's estimated prevalence of a belief led to increased endorsement of said belief. Belief endorsement rose when impressions of the belief's prevalence were increased and when initial beliefs were uncertain, as predicted by a Bayesian cue integration framework. Thus, ...[more]
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